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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a new model for multi-issue negotiation un-
der time constraints in an incomplete information setting. In this
model the order in which issues are bargained over and agreements
are reached is determined endogenously as part of the bargaining
equilibrium. We show that the sequential implementation of the
equilibrium agreement gives a better outcome than a simultaneous
implementation when agents have like, as well as conﬂicting, time
preferences. We also show that the equilibrium solution possesses
the properties of uniqueness and symmetry, although it is not al-
ways Pareto-optimal.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.11 [Distributed Artiﬁcial Intelligence]: Multiagent Systems;
K.4.4 [Computers and Society]: Electronic Commerce
General Terms
Algorithms, Design
Keywords
Negotiation, game theory, agendas
1. INTRODUCTION
Agent mediated negotiation has received considerable attention in
the ﬁeld of electronic commerce [14, 9, 7]. In many of the appli-
cations that are conceived in this domain it is important that the
agents should not only bargain over the price of a product, but also
take into account aspects like the delivery time, quality, payment
methods, and other product speciﬁc properties. In such multi-issue
negotiations, the agents should be able to negotiate outcomes that
are mutually beneﬁcial for both parties [11]. However the com-
plexity of the bargaining problem increases rapidly as the number
of issues increases. Given this increase in complexity, there is a
need to develop software agents that can operate effectively in such
circumstances. To this end, this paper reports on the development
of a new model for multi-issue negotiation between two agents.
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In such bilateralmulti-issue negotiations, one approach isto bun-
dle all the issues and discuss them simultaneously. This allows the
players to exploit trade-offs among different issues, but requires
complex computations to be performed [11]. The other approach
— which is computationally simpler — is to negotiate the issues
sequentially. Although issue-by-issue negotiation minimizes the
complexity of the negotiation procedure, an important question that
arises is the order in which the issues are bargained. This ordering
is called the negotiation agenda. Moreover, one of the factors that
determines the outcome of negotiation is this agenda [4]. To this
end, there are two ways of incorporating agendas in the negotia-
tion model. One is to ﬁx the agenda exogenously as part of the
negotiation procedure [4]. The other way, which is more ﬂexible,
is to allow the bargainers to decide which issue they will negotiate
next during the process of negotiation. This is called an endoge-
nous agenda [5]. Against this background, this paper presents a
multi-issue negotiation model with an endogenous agenda.
To provide a setting for our negotiation model, we consider the
case in which negotiation needs to be completed by a speciﬁed
time (which may be different for the different parties). Apart from
the agents’ respective deadlines, the time at which agreement is
reached can effect the agents in different ways. An agent can gain
utility with time, and have the incentive to reach a late agreement
(within the bounds of its deadline). In such a case it is said to be a
strong (patient) player. The other possibility is that it can lose util-
ity with time and have the incentive to reach an early agreement.
It is then said to be a weak (impatient) player. As we will show,
this disposition and the actual deadline itself strongly inﬂuence the
negotiation outcome. Other parameters that effect the outcome in-
clude the agents’strategies, their utilities and their reservation lim-
its. However, in most practical cases agents do not have complete
information on all of these parameters. Thus in this work we focus
on bilateral negotiation between agents with time constraints and
incomplete information.
To this end, Fatima et al presented a single-issue model for ne-
gotiation between two agents under time constraints and in an in-
complete information setting [3]. Within this context, they deter-
mined optimal strategies for agents but did not address the issue of
the existence of equilibrium. Here we adopt this framework and
prove that mutual strategic behavior of agents, where both use their
respective optimal strategies, results in equilibrium. We then ex-
tend this framework for multi-issue negotiation between a buyer
and a seller for the price of more than one good/service. Speciﬁ-
cally, each agent has a deadline before which agreement must end
on all the issues. However, the order in which issues are bargained
over and agreements are reached is determined by the equilibrium
strategies. These strategies optimize the time at which an issue is
settled and are therefore appropriate for the sequential implemen-tation scheme. Moreover, we show that the sequential implemen-
tation of the equilibrium agreement results in an outcome that is
no worse than the outcome for the simultaneous implementation,
both when agents have like as well as conﬂicting time preferences.
Finally, we study the properties of the equilibrium solution.
This work extends the state of the art by presenting a more re-
alistic negotiation model that captures the following three aspects
of many real life bargaining situations. Firstly, it is a model for
negotiating multiple issues. Secondly, it takes the time constraints
of bargainers into consideration. Thirdly it allows agents to have
incomplete information about each other.
In section 2 we ﬁrst give an overview of the single-issue negotia-
tion model of [3] and then prove that the mutual strategic behavior
of agents where both use their respective optimal strategies results
in equilibrium. In section 3 we extend this model to allow multi-
issue negotiation and study the properties of the equilibrium solu-
tion. Section 4 discusses related work. Finally section 5 gives the
conclusions.
2. SINGLE-ISSUENEGOTIATIONMODEL
In this section we ﬁrst provide an overview of the single issue ne-
gotiation model and a brief description of the optimal strategies as
determined in [3]. Due to lack of space, we describe the optimal
strategy determination for one speciﬁc negotiation scenario. We
then prove that the optimal strategy proﬁles form sequential equi-
librium points.
2.1 The Negotiation Protocol
This is basically an alternating offers protocol. Let
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2.2 Counter-offer generation
Since both agents have a deadline, we assume that they use a time
dependent tactic(e.g. linear (L), Boulware (B)or Conceder (C)) [2]
for generating the offers. In these tactics, the predominant factor
used to decide which value to offer next is time
 . The tactics vary
the value of price depending on the remaining negotiation time,
modeled as the above deﬁned constant
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Figure 1: Negotiation outcome for Boulware and Conceder
functions
A wide range of time dependent functions can be deﬁned by vary-
ing the way in which
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￿ is computed (see [2] for more details).
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These families of negotiation decision functions (NDF) represent
an inﬁnite number of possible tactics, one for each value of
 .
However, depending on the value of
 , two extreme sets show
clearly different patterns of behaviour.
1. Boulware [11]. For this tactic
 
 
￿ and close to zero. The
initial offer is maintained till time is almost exhausted, when
the agent concedes up to its reservtion value.
2. Conceder [10]. For this tactic
  is high. The agent goes
to its reservation value very quickly and maintains the same
offer till the deadline. Finally when
 
￿
￿price is increased
linearly.
The value of a counter offer depends on the initial price (IP) at
which theagent startsnegotiation,theﬁnalprice(FP)beyondwhich
the agent does not concede,
  and
 
￿. A vector V of these four
variables, i.e., V = [IP, FP,
 
￿,
 ] forms the agent’s strategy. Let
 
￿
￿
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
 
￿
￿
￿
 
 
￿
￿. The negotiation outcome
 
is an element of
￿
￿
 
 
 
￿
 
 
￿, where the pair (
 
 
 ) denotes the price
and time at which agreement is reached and
  denotes the conﬂict
outcome.
For example, when
 ’s strategy is deﬁned as
￿
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
 
 
 
￿
and
 ’s strategy is deﬁned as
￿
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
 
 
 
￿, the outcome
(
 
￿) that results is shown in ﬁgure 1. As shown in the ﬁgure,
agreement is reached at a price
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
 
 
 
 -
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
￿
￿ and
at a time close to T. Similarly when the NDF in both strategies is
replaced with C, then agreement (
 
￿) is reached at the same price
but towards the beginning of negotiation.
2.3 Agents’ information state
Each agent has a reservation limit, a deadline, a utility function and
a strategy. Thus the buyer and seller each have four parameters
denoted
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The outcome of negotiation depends on all these eight parameters.The information state
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Thus agents have uncertain information about each other’s dead-
line and reservation price. However, the agents do not know their
opponent’s utility function or strategy.
Agents’ utilitiesare deﬁned withthefollowing two von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility functions [6] that incorporate the effect of time
discounting.
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time. Note that the agents may have different discounting factors.
Agents are said to have similar time preferences if both gain on
time or both lose on time. Otherwise they have conﬂicting time
preferences. Each agent’s information is its private information
that is not known to the opponent.
2.4 Optimal strategies
We describe how optimal strategies are obtained for players that
are von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility maximizers. Since
utility isa function of price and time, these strategies optimize both.
The discussion is from the perspective of the buyer (although the
same analysis can be taken from the perspective of the seller).
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Figure 2: Possible buyer strategies in a particular negotiation
scenario
No matter which strategy (B, C or L)
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An agent’s utility from price is independent of its utility from
time, i.e, the buyer always prefers a low price to a high price, and
for a given price it always prefers a late agreement to an early one.
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gives the optimal price
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means that the optimal price is
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Assume that the seller also gains on time and
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and some value greater than
 
￿ respectively. Since both possible
values of the buyer’s deadline are greater than its own, irrespective
of its value for
 
￿, it has to concede up to
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￿ by
 
￿. Thus from
the seller’s perspective, the optimal price
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timal time
 
￿
￿
￿
 
￿. In such a scenario, the optimal strategy for
 
is to start at some high price, make small concessions till its dead-
line is almost reached and then offer the reservation price
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order for the
  and
  strategies to converge, the values of
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 ’s lotteries should be such that
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When these conditions are satisﬁed
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￿ and
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￿ equals
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￿. The optimal strategies
 
￿
￿
￿
 
￿ then converge and result in an
agreement at price
 
￿
￿
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￿
￿ and time
 
￿
￿ (see ﬁgure 2).
  gets the
entire price-surplus.
When both buyer and seller lose utility on time, the optimal strat-
egy for them is to offer
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ at the earliest opportunity. This can
be done using a Conceder NDF that results in agreement at the
same price
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ but towards the beginning of negotiation. In the
same way, optimal strategies are obtained for the remaining nego-
tiation scenarios. These are summarised in table 1.
 
￿ denotes the
beginning of negotiation. A similar kind of analysis is made from
the seller’s perspective to obtain
 
￿
￿ and
 
￿
￿ in the six possible sce-
narios. In each of these scenarios, the agents’ optimal strategies do
not depend on their opponent’s strategy. Again see [3] for details.
There are many scenarios in which negotiation can take place.
These depend on the agents’ attitude towards time and the rela-
tionship between their deadlines. As stated earlier in this section,
there are six possible scenarios from the buyer’s perspective, on the
basis of which it selects its strategy. Similarly from the seller’s per-
spective there are also six possible scenarios. But the negotiation
outcome depends on allpossible ways in which interaction between
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Table 2: Outcome of negotiation when both agents use their
respective optimal strategies
  and
  can take place. There can be six possible orderings on the
agent deadlines:
1.
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￿
￿ (D1)
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￿
￿ (D6)
Foreach of theseorderings,the agents’ attitudestowards timecould
be one of the following:
1. Both buyer and seller gain utility with time (Case 1).
2. Buyer gains and seller loses utility with time (Case 2).
3. Buyer loses and seller gains utility with time (Case 3).
4. Both buyer and seller lose utility with time (Case 4).
Thus in total there are 24 possible negotiation scenarios and the
outcome of negotiation depends on the exact scenario. A summary
of these is given in table 2.
 
￿
￿ indicates that the price-surplus goes
to
  and
 
￿
￿ indicates that the price-surplus goes to
 . As seen
in this table, the price-surplus always goes to the agent with the
longer deadline. The time of agreement is
 
￿ (which denotes the
beginning of negotiation) if both agents lose on time, and the earlier1
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Figure 3: Extensive form of the negotiation game
deadline if at least one agent gains on time. Note that these are
the outcomes that will result if the agents’ beliefs about each other
satisfy the following conditions for convergence of strategies.
1. (
 
￿
 
 
￿
￿)i f(
 
￿
￿
 
￿
￿) and (
 
￿
 
 
￿
￿)i f(
 
￿
￿
 
￿
￿ ) for
 .
2. (
 
￿
 
 
￿
￿)i f(
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿) and (
 
￿
 
 
￿
￿)i f(
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿) for
 .
3. (
 
￿
 
 
￿
￿)i f(
 
￿
￿
 
￿
￿) and (
 
￿
 
 
￿
￿)i f(
 
￿
￿
 
￿
￿ ) for
 .
4. (
 
￿
 
 
￿
￿)i f(
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿) and (
 
￿
 
 
￿
￿)i f(
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿) for
 .
The similarity between these results and those of Sandholm and
Vulkan [15] on bargaining with deadlines is that, in both cases,
the price-surplus always goes to the agent with the longer dead-
line. However, the difference is that in [15] the deadline effect
overrides time discounting, whereas here the deadline effect does
not override time discounting. This happens because in [15] the
agents always make offers that lie within the zone of agreeement.
In our model, agents initially make offers that lie outside this zone,
and thereby delay the time of agreement. Thus when agents have
conﬂicting time preferences, in our case, agreement is reached near
the earlier deadline, but in [15] agreement is reached towards the
beginning of negotiation.
The single issue negotiation model of [3] only determines opti-
mal strategies for agents on the basis of available information and
shows the resulting outcome. However such an outcome is only
possible if this mutual strategic behavior of agents leads to equi-
librium. In the following subsection we prove this by using the
standard game theoretic solution concept of sequential equilibrium.
2.5 Equilibrium agreements
Since agents do not have information about their opponent’s strat-
egy or utility, negotiation can be considered as a game
￿ of in-
complete information. A strategy proﬁle and belief system pair is a
sequential equilibriumof an extensive game if it issequential ratio-
nal and consistent [8]. A system of beliefs
  in an extensive form
game
￿ is a speciﬁcation of a probability
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￿
￿
 
￿
￿ for each deci-
sion node
  in
￿ such that
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
￿
 
￿
￿
￿for all information sets
￿. In other words,
  represents the agent’s beliefs about the history
of negotiation. The player’s strategies satisfy sequential rationality
if for each information set of each player
 , the strategy of player
 
is a best response to the other player’s strategies, given
 ’s beliefs
at that information set. The requirement for
  to be consistent with
the strategy proﬁle is as follows. Even at an infromation set that
is not reached if all players adhere to their strategies, it is required
that a player’s belief be derived from some strategy proﬁle using
Bayes’ rule.
THEOREM 1. There exists sequential equilibrium of
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scenario corresponding to case 1 and deadline ordering
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PROOF. The ﬁrst three levels of the extensive form of this game
are shown in ﬁgure 3. At node 1 one of the players, say
 , starts
negotiation by using its optimal strategy
￿
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￿
 
 
￿. Play
reaches node 2. At this level it is player
 ’s turn to make a de-
cision.
￿
￿ becomes the information set for
  since it is unaware
of the strategy used by
  and hence does not know which of the
three nodes 2, 3 or 4 play has reached. However, irrespective of
which node play reaches at this level (i.e., irrespective of
 ’s be-
lief about the history of negotiation), the dominant strategy for
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￿. Play now reaches node 5 (since both agents
use B) at which
  makes a move. At this point
  does not know
exactly which node the play is at, but it knows with certainty that
its information set
￿
￿ is reached (the probability of reaching other
decision nodes at this level is 0). The dominant strategy for
  at
this information set (and at all others) is
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at every information set at which it is
 ’s turn to make a move,
its optimal strategy is
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￿, and at every informa-
tion set at which it is
 ’s turn to make a move, its optimal strategy
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￿ therefore satisﬁes the requirements for sequen-
tial rationality. Furthermore, at every information set, the optimal
strategies are also dominant strategies. This makes the strategy
proﬁle
￿
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
 
￿
￿
 
 
￿
￿
 
 
￿
￿
￿
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
 
￿
￿
 
 
￿
￿
 
 
￿ a sequential equi-
librium point irrespective of the agents’ beliefs about the history of
negotiation.
COROLLARY 1. The optimalstrategy proﬁle constitutes aunique
equilibrium.
PROOF. This is a direct consequence of the above proof. As the
optimal strategies for both agents are dominant strategies at each
of their information sets, there does not exist any other equilibrium
(neither a pure nor a mixed strategy) where an agent uses a strategy
other than its optimal strategy.
In the same way, sequential equilibrium can be shown to exist
when agents use their optimal strategies in all the remaining nego-
tiation scenarios.
3. MULTI-ISSUE NEGOTIATION
We now extend the above model for multi-issue bargaining where
the issues are independent
2 of each other. Assume that buyer,
 ,
and seller,
 , that have unequal deadlines, bargain over the price of
two distinct goods/services, X and Y. Negotiation on all the issues
must end before the deadline. We consider two goods/services in
order to simplify the discussion but this is a general framework that
works for more than two goods/services.
3.1 Agents’ information state
Let the buyer’s reservation prices for X and Y be
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￿ and
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￿ and the
seller’s reservation prices be
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￿
￿ respectively. The buyer’s
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￿Independence is a common and reasonable assumption to make in
this context. Future work will deal with the dependent case.where
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￿ are the information about its own
parameters and
 
￿
￿,
 
￿
￿ and
 
￿
￿ are three lotteries that denote its be-
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Similarly, the seller’s information state is deﬁned as:
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An agent’s information state is its private knowledge. The agents’
utility functions are deﬁned as:
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Note that the discounting factors are different for different issues.
This allows agents’ attitudes toward time to be different for differ-
ent issues.
3.2 Negotiation protocol
Again we use an alternating offers negotiation protocol. There are
two types of offers. An offer on just one good is referred to as
a single offer and an offer on two goods is referred to as a com-
bined offer. One of the agents starts by making a combined offer.
The other agent can accept/reject part of the offer (single issue) or
the complete offer. If it rejects the complete offer, then it sends a
combined counter-offer. This process of making combined offers
continues till agreement is reached on one of the issues. Thereafter
agents make offers only on the remaining issue (i.e., once agree-
ment is reached on an issue, it cannot be renegotiated). Negotiation
ends when agreement is reached on both the issues or a deadline is
reached. Thus the action A that agent
  takes at time
  on a single
offer is as deﬁned in section 2.1 . Its action on a combined offer,
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5. Offer
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￿ if
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A counter-offer for an issue is generated using the method de-
scribed in section 2.2. Although agents initially make offers on
both issues, there is no restriction on the price they offer. Thus
by initially offering a price that lies outside the zone of agreement,
an agent can effectively delay the time of agreement for that issue.
For example,
  can offer a very low price which will not be accept-
able to
  and
  can offer a price which will not be acceptable to
 .
In this way, the order in which the issues are bargained over and
agreements are reached is determined endogenously as part of the
bargaining equilibrium rather than imposed exogenously as part of
the game tree.
Two implementation rules are possible for this protocol [4]. One
is sequential implementation in which agreement on an issue is im-
plemented as soon as it is settled; and the other is simultaneous
implementation in which agreement is implemented only after all
the issues are settled. We ﬁrst list the equilibrium agreements in
different negotiation scenarios and then compare the outcome that
results from the sequential implementation with that of the simul-
taneous implementation.
Negotiation Scenario Time of agreement
 
 
XY XY XY
1 GG GG
 
 
2 GG GL
 
 
3 GG LG
 
 
4 GG LL
 
 
5 GL GG
 
 
6 GL GL
 
 
￿
7 GL LG
 
 
8 GL LL
 
 
￿
9 LG GG
 
 
10 LG GL
 
 
11 LG LG
 
￿
 
12 LG LL
 
￿
 
13 LL GG
 
 
14 LL GL
 
 
￿
15 LL LG
 
￿
 
16 LL LL
 
￿
 
￿
Table 3: Equilibrium agreements for two issues X and Y
3.3 Equilibrium strategies
We assume that the conditions for convergence (as listed in sec-
tion 2.4) are satisﬁed for both X and Y. As agents negotiate over
the price of two distinct goods/services, the equilibrium strategies
for the single issue model can be applied to X and Y independently
of each other. The equilibrium agreements in different negotiation
scenarios are listed in table 3. T equals
 
￿ if (
 
￿
 
 
￿) and
 
￿ if
(
 
￿
 
 
￿).
 
￿ denotes the beginning of negotiation. G indicates
that the agent gains utility on time and L indicates that it loses on
time. The price-surplus on both issues always goes to the agent
with the longer deadline (see section 2.4).
Consider a situation where both
  and
  lose on time on X and
gain on time on Y (row 11 of table 3). Let
 
￿
 
 
￿. Assuming the
conditions for convergence are satisﬁed,
 ’s equilibrium strategies
for X and Y are
￿
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
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￿
and those for
  are
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￿
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￿
 
 
￿ and
￿
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
 
￿
￿
 
 
￿
 
 
￿
(see table 1). During the process of negotiation, agents generate
offers using these strategies. This results in an agreement on X
towards the beginning of negotiation, and on Y at time
 
￿ (which
is the earlier deadline). The price-surplus for X and Y goes to the
agent with the longer deadline, i.e.,
 .
3.4 Implementation schemes
Any two strategies
￿
 
￿
 
 
￿
￿ lead to an outcome of the game. If
 
￿ and
 
￿ are the equilibrium strategies, then the outcome is an
agreement on X at time
  and price
 
￿ and an agreement on Y at
time
  and price
 
￿. Payoffs for this outcome depend on the rules
by which agreements are implemented.
￿ Sequential implementation. Exchange ofa given good/service
takes place atthetimeof agreement on a priceforthat good/service.
The agents’ utilities from the strategy pair
￿
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￿
￿ leading
to agreements
￿
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￿ and
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￿ Simultaneous implementation. Exchange of goods/services
takes place only after agreement is reached on prices of allthe goods. The agents’utilities for this rule are:
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Since the equilibrium strategies optimize the time (and price) of
agreement on an issue, it seems obvious that the agents will be bet-
ter off if exchange takes place sequentially rather than simultane-
ously. However, since agents can have like, as well as, conﬂicting
time preferences, it is important to determine if sequential imple-
mentation proves better than simultaneous implementation for both
agents under all negotiation scenarios. We show below that sequen-
tial implementation of the equilibrium agreement always gives a
better outcome than simultaneous implementation.
THEOREM 2. The outcome generated by sequential implemen-
tation is no worse than the outcome for simultaneous implementa-
tion for both agents.
PROOF. When at least one of the agents gains on time on an
issue, say X, then the equilibrium strategies result in an agreement
at the earlier of the two deadlines. If
 
￿
 
 
￿, then
 
￿
 
￿ and
 
￿
￿
 
￿
￿ and if
 
￿
 
 
￿ then
 
￿
 
￿ and
 
￿
￿
 
￿
￿. When both
agents lose on time on X, then agreement is reached towards the
beginning of negotiation. Thus
 
￿
 
￿ and
 
￿
￿
 
￿
￿ if
 
￿
 
 
￿
and
 
￿
￿
 
￿
￿ if
 
￿
 
 
￿. As shown in table 3, the agents have like
time preferences in the ﬁrst and last rows. In all other cases they
have conﬂicting preferences on at least one issue. There are three
possible ways in which agreement can be reached between agents.
We analyze each of these cases below.
1. Both issues are agreed upon near the earlier deadline. Here
 
￿
 . Such an agreement is possible only if, for every issue,
at least one agent gains on time. If
 
￿ and
 
￿ are the prices
that are agreed for X and Y,the expressions below yield equal
utility from both implementation schemes to both
  and
 .
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2. Both issues are agreed upon towards the beginning of ne-
gotiation. This happens when both agents lose on time on
both the issues. As in case 1, the expressions for utility from
sequential and simultaneous schemes yield the same values
since
 
￿
 
￿
 
￿.
3. One issue is agreed towards the beginning of negotiation and
the other near the earlier deadline. This occurs when both
agents lose on time on one of the issues, say X, and at least
one agent gains on time on the other issue, say Y. Here
 
￿
 
￿ and the buyer’s utilities from sequential and simultaneous
implementations are:
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The utility from X is greater for sequential implementation
since
 
￿
 
 and both agents lose on time. The utility from Y
is equal for both schemes. As a result, sequential implemen-
tation gives a total utility that is higher than simultaneous
implementation. The utility that the seller gets is:
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
￿
￿
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
Æ
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
￿
￿
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
Æ
￿
￿
￿
￿
and
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
￿
￿
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
Æ
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
￿
￿
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
Æ
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
As
  also loses on time on X, its utility from X is higher for
sequential implementation giving a higher cumulative utility
than simultaneous implementation. Thus sequential imple-
mentation always gives a better outcome than simultaneous
implementation.
The same argument holds good when
  and
  negotiate over more
than two issues. Thus from the perspective of both agents, sequen-
tial implementation proves to be a better implementation scheme
than simultaneous implementation.
3.5 Properties of equilibrium solution
The main focus in the design of a negotiation model is on the prop-
erties of the outcome, since the choice of a model depends on the
attributes of the solution it generates. We therefore study some im-
portant properties [8] of the equilibrium agreement.
1. Uniqueness. Ifthesolution of thenegotiation gameisunique,
then it can be identiﬁed unequivocally.
THEOREM 3. Foreach negotiationscenario, the proposed
negotiation model has a unique equilibrium agreement.
PROOF. There are
  independent negotiation issues each
of which has a single equilibrium agreement (see section 2.5
for proof). This gives a unique equilibrium agreement for all
  issues.
2. Symmetry. A bargaining mechanism is said to be symmet-
ric if it does not treat the players differently on the basis of
inappropriate criteria. Exactly what constitutes inappropri-
ate criteria depends on the speciﬁc domain. The proposed
negotiation mechanism possesses the property of symmetry
since the outcome does not depend on which player starts the
process of negotiation.
THEOREM 4. In all negotiation scenarios, the bargain-
ing outcome is independent of the identity of the ﬁrst player.
PROOF. As shown in table 3, there are two time points
at which agreements can be reached;
 
￿ which denotes the
beginning of negotiation or T which is the earlier deadline.
Atthese timepoints one of the agents (either
  or
 depending
on whose turn it is) offers the equilibrium solution which the
other agent accepts.
3. Efﬁciency. An agreement is efﬁcient if there is no wasted
utility, i.e, the agreement satisﬁes Pareto-optimality. The
equilibrium solution in the proposed model is Pareto-optimal
in some, but not all, negotiation scenarios.
THEOREM 5. When players have opposite time prefer-
ences on an issue and the agent with the longer deadline
loses on time on that issue, the equilibrium solution is not
necessarily Pareto-optimal.
PROOF. Consider row5 oftable 3. Assumethat
 
￿
 
 
￿.
On issue Y, the agents have conﬂicting time preferences. As
 
￿
 
 
￿,
 
￿
 
￿ and the price-surplus in the equilibrium
solution goes to
  (
 
￿
￿
 
￿
￿). The utility to an agent canbe increased by changing price or time or both. Price
￿
 
￿
￿
can only be increased and
  can only be decreased, since a
decrease in price or an increase in
  will be unacceptable
to
 . An increase in
 
￿ decreases
 
￿ and increases
 
￿.A
decrease in
  increases
 
￿ and decreases
 
￿. But a change
in both
 
￿ and
  can improve both
 
￿ and
 
￿. The same
argument holds for the other cases.
In all the remanining scenarios it can be seen that the solution
is Pareto-efﬁcient; an increase in one agent’s uitlity lowers its
opponent’s utility.
4. RELATED WORK
Fershtman [4] extends Rubinstein’s complete information model
[12] for splitting a single pie to multiple pies. This model imposes
an agenda exogenously, and studies the relation between the agenda
and the outcome of the bargaining game. It is based on the assump-
tion that both players have identical discounting factors and does
not consider agent deadlines. Similar work in a complete informa-
tion setting includes [5] but it endogenizes the agenda.
Bac and Raff [1] developed a model that has an endogenous
agenda. They extend Rubinstein’s model [13] for single pie bar-
gaining withincomplete information by adding asecondpie. In this
model the price-surplus is known to both agents. For both agents,
the discounting factor is assumed to be equal over all the issues.
One of the players knows its own discounting factor and that of
its opponent. The other player knows its own discounting factor
but is uncertain of the opponent’s discounting factor. This can take
one of two values,
Æ
￿ with probability
￿ and
Æ
￿ with probability
￿
￿
￿. These probabilities are common knowledge. Thus agents
have asymmetric information about discounting factors. They how-
ever do not associate deadlines with players.
The difference between these models and ours is that ﬁrstly, our
model considers both agent deadlines and discounting factors. Sec-
ondly, in our case the players are uncertain about the opponent’s
reservation price and deadline. Each agent knows its own reserva-
tion price and deadline buthas abinary probability distributionover
its opponent’s reservation price and deadline. Moreover, the dis-
counting factor is different for different issues and the players have
no information about the opponent’s discounting factors. Thirdly,
each agent’s information state is its private knowledge which is not
known to its opponent. Our model is therefore closer to most real
life bargaining situations than the other models. The fourth point of
difference lies in the attributes of the solution. Comparing the solu-
tion properties of these models, we see that the existing models do
not have a unique equilibrium solution. The equilibrium solution
depends on the identity of the ﬁrst player. In our model, the equi-
librium solution is unique and is independent of the identity of the
ﬁrst player. However, as is the case with our model, the equilibrium
solution is not always Pareto-optimal in the other models.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presented amodel formulti-issue negotiation undertime
constraints in anincomplete information setting. The orderin which
issues are bargained over and agreements are reached is determined
endogenously as part of the bargaining equilibrium rather than im-
posed exogenously as part of the game tree. An important property
of this model is the existence of a unique equilibrium. For any is-
sue, this equilibrium results in agreement at the earlier deadline if
at least one agent has the incentive to reach a late agreement and
at the beginning of negotiation if both agents have the incentive to
reach an early agreement. The price-surplus on all issues goes to
the agent with the longer deadline.
Thesequentialimplementation of the equilibrium agreement was
shown to result in an outcome that is no worse than the outcome for
simultaneous implementation when agents have similar, as well as
conﬂicting, timepreferences. The equilibrium agreementpossesses
the properties of being unique and symmetric, although it is not
always Pareto-optimal.
As it currently stands, our model considered the negotiation is-
sues to be independent of each other. In future we intend to study
bargaining over interdependent issues. Apart from this, our model
considered the case where agents had uncertain information about
each other’s deadline and reservation price. In future we will in-
troduce learning into the model that will allow the agents to learn
these parameters during negotiation. These extensions will take the
model further towards real life bargaining situations.
6. REFERENCES
[1] M. Bac and H. Raff. Issue-by-issue negotiations: the role of
information and time preference. Games and Economic
Behavior, 13:125–134, 1996.
[2] P. Faratin, C. Sierra, and N. R. Jennings. Negotiation
decision functions for autonomous agents. International
Journal of Robotics and Autonomous Systems,
24(3-4):159–182, 1998.
[3] S. S. Fatima, M. J. Wooldridge, and N. R. Jennings. Optimal
negotiation strategies for agents with incomplete
information. In ATAL-2001, pages 53–68, Seattle, USA,
2001.
[4] C. Fershtman. The importance of the agenda in bargaining.
Games and Economic Behavior, 2:224–238, 1990.
[5] R. Inderst. Multi-issue bargaining with endogenous agenda.
Games and Economic Behavior, 30:64–82, 2000.
[6] R. Keeney and H. Raiffa. Decisions with Multiple
Objectives: Preferences and Value Tradeoffs. New York:
John Wiley, 1976.
[7] A. Lomuscio, M. Wooldridge, and N. R. Jennings. A
classiﬁcation scheme for negotiation in electronic commerce.
In F. Dignum and C. Sierra, editors, Agent-Mediated
Electronic Commerce: A European Agentlink Perspective.,
pages 19–33. Springer Verlag, 2001.
[8] M.J.Osborne and A. Rubinstein. A Course in Game Theory.
The MIT Press, Cambridge, England, 1998.
[9] R. P. Maes and A.G.Moukas. Agents that buy and sell.
Communications of the ACM, 42(3):81–91, 1999.
[10] D. G. Pruitt. Negotiation Behavior. Academic Press, 1981.
[11] H. Raiffa. The Art and Science of Negotiation. Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, USA, 1982.
[12] A. Rubinstein. Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model.
Econometrica, 50(1):97–109, January 1982.
[13] A. Rubinstein. A bargaining model with incomplete
information about time preferences. Econometrica,
53:1151–1172, January 1985.
[14] T. Sandholm. Agents in electronic commerce: component
technologies for automated negotiation and coalition
formation. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems,
3(1):73–96, 2000.
[15] T. Sandholm and N. Vulkan. Bargianing with deadlines. In
AAAI-99, pages 44–51, Orlando, FL, 1999.